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Acronyms

AIMS	Accounting Information Management System
AR	Annual Review
AWP	Annual Work Plan
AWPB	Annual Work Plan and Budget
BIMS	Billing Information Management System
BRA	Banadir Region Administration
CD	Capacity Development
CSI	Civil Service Institute
DAC	Development Assistance Committee
DANIDA	Danish International Development Agency
DDF	District Development Framework
DDP	District Development Plan
DFID	Department for International Development
DG	Director General
EU	European Union
FGS	Federal Government of Somalia
FMIS	Financial Management Information Systems
GE	Gender Equality
GEWE	Gender Equality and Women's Empowerment
IDC	Intermedia Development Consultants
IJA	Interim Jubaland Administration
ILO	International Labor Organization
IMC	Inter-ministerial Committee
IMC-LG	Inter-ministerial Committee on Local Governance
ISWA	Interim South-West Administration
JPLG	Joint Programme on Local Governance and Decentralized Service Delivery
JPSC	Joint Programme Steering Committee
LDF	Local Development Fund
LEA	Local Economic Assessment
LED	Local Economic Development
LOA	Letter of Agreement
LGB	Local Governance Barometer
LGI	Local Governance Institute
M&E	Monitoring and Evaluation
MPTF	Multi-Partner Trust Fund
PRODOC II	Programme Document for the Joint Programme on Local Governance and Decentralized Service Delivery Second Phase

Executive Summary

A final evaluation of the second phase of the Joint Programme on Local Governance (JPLG II) was conducted between October 5 and December 5, 2019. Overall, the evaluation concludes that this programme has achieved important results and has been able to carry out, over a long period of time, interventions which, in nature and scope, are highly relevant to Somali citizens living in the areas targeted by the programme. The programme has found a “niche” in the development space that immediately follows stabilization activities and the one where institutions are strong enough to meaningfully interact with other counterparts on sustainable development issues. The programme is at its most successful when it can engage on a systematic basis with government counterparts and local stakeholders. This proximity work distinguishes it and is paramount for its success.

The focus on local governments is appropriate and meaningfully complements the ongoing discussions and dialogue on governance between development partners with the Governments of Somalia and Somaliland, the Federal Member States (FMS) and local governments. Further, a focus on local governments allows progress on issues of governance and service delivery, while local stakeholders continue to discuss the institutional infrastructure of the states.

JPLG has acquired a positive reputation vis-à-vis the local counterparts and ownership of the programme among local stakeholders appears to be significant. Accordingly, this evaluation believes that JPLG remains a useful vehicle for five uniquely qualified agencies to cooperate to bring about impactful development to the areas in which the programme operates.

Despite this positive assessment, the evaluation believes that the programme, which is now reaching maturity, needs to evolve from the current way it does things in order to serve as an “incubator for good practices in local government”. The programme is being called to cater to districts and local governments with increasingly diverse problems. In order to successfully operate, the programme must increase its knowledge base, strengthen its implementation arrangements, including its capacity to conduct proximity work, provide a broader menu of interventions, and acquire the ability to quickly learn and adapt.

Based on the analysis above, the programme could:

- Revise Intervention Modalities to allow the programme more flexibility to engage with a wide array of government counterparts, particularly as it expands its reach in the new FMS;
- Refocus the programme squarely on service delivery, since good service delivery is the byproduct of good governance practices and successful capacity development. Additionally, it is the principal element on which local government performance is assessed by the population and ultimately what gives it its institutional credibility. Refocusing the project on service delivery does not mean that the programme would change what it is doing, but instead would evaluate the nature, sequence and scope of its intervention in terms of their impact on service delivery in the short, medium and long term.
- Use infrastructure investments as linchpin for inter-agency cooperation: The programme currently uses infrastructure investments as an incentive for local governments to adopt the programme’s systems, regulations and processes. The evaluation does not recommend that the programme becomes a vehicle for infrastructure construction. Instead it recommends that the infrastructure investment become the opportunity to assist local governments in implementing some of the strategies, policies and action plans it has developed. Focusing JPLG interventions to support local governments around the investment to be financed will improve the investment efficacy, but also enables participating agencies to take on a more experimental approach by being able to pilot new ways to carry out project functions.
- Develop new instruments to complement existing ones: The programme has used a number of instruments

to cater to its current beneficiaries. As it embarks on expansion into the new FMS, the programme could benefit from expanding its intervention menu to ensure maximum relevance. Specifically, the program could consider identifying and developing new instruments to enable local governments to provide social assistance, without having to resort to the employment of minimally qualified staff at low wages. With regards to capacity development, the program will have to focus more consistently on how to increase capacity despite high staff turnover as well as using technology to complement its proximity work.

- Continue to strengthen Programme Management Arrangements: In this context, the evaluation recommends centralizing contract administration and staff management responsibilities at the level of the Programme Management Unit (PMU), empowering agency leads to provide more sustained technical leadership and to expand proximity work on the part of the field-based teams.
- Strengthen the knowledge base and understanding of local circumstances. Since the programme is being called to respond to a more varied array of circumstances, the evaluation recommends that increased attention be focused on understanding the political economy of the specific district in which the programme aims to operate, and to improve social and economic analysis in LDF investment feasibility studies.
- Review the programme's conceptual framework and improve Monitoring and Evaluation in order to clarify the ultimate programme objectives and strengthen its ability to monitor impact and assist local authorities in carrying out fact-based policy decisions.

1. Introduction

1.1 Background and Context

This section will briefly describe the overall background in which the programme was operating (Section 1.1.1) and subsequently, the specific programme background (Section 1.1.2)

1.1.1 Country Background

Somalia has survived two and half decades of cycles of violent armed conflict and fragility which have destroyed infrastructure and formal institutions both at the federal level and the local level. August 2012 marked the beginning of a long process of stabilization, despite the continuing threat of Al-Shabab. Somalia since that time has been operating under a provisional constitution¹ which continues in use today as negotiations towards a permanent constitution are ongoing. Article 48 of this constitution states that “Somalia is a federal state which is composed by a federal government², Federal Member states which have a member state government and local governments”³. The constitution currently under construction, confirms these principles. The specific details of how decentralization will take place, when and how responsibilities are going to be devolved to the lower levels of government remain unclear. Most importantly, there is still no definite agreement on the nature of the political and financial relationship between the Federal Government and Member States. This uncertainty affects the speed and organization of deeper and more comprehensive institutional reforms.

Despite this fluid environment and all its contradictions, over the last seven years, Somalia has taken significant steps towards a political settlement and the rehabilitation of government institutions. A federal government has begun to operate in the country; Four new member states – Jubbaland, South-West, Galmudug and Hirshabelle - have been created and the institutions in Somaliland and Puntland have begun to consolidate.

Selective decentralization to the district level, has also begun, especially in Somaliland and Puntland where institutions are more established. Across Somaliland and Federal Member States (FMS), however, state formation is very much work in progress. While tangible progress is occurring and, in some parts of the country it’s visible, all across Somaliland and FMS there are many places in which the institutions are completely absent. Where the State is operating, for the most part, strong formal institutions remain absent. Laws, procedures if and when they exist are deemed inadequate. Since the Public Administration was decimated by war, staff to adequately administer the country is scarce, especially outside the larger cities.

Along with institutional devastation, Somalia must contend with the devastation of its physical infrastructure. Most districts beyond the larger cities are missing most infrastructure. This includes roads, schools, parks, health clinics – just to name a few. As a result, the population’s capacity to access basic services is severely constrained. Instilling legitimacy to formal institutions requires visible changes in the conditions of citizens and therefore the creation of local institutions that are performing and delivering tangible improvements in the day to day life of the citizen.

1.1.2 Programme Background

¹ The Somali Provisional Constitution was adopted in August 2012

² Article 48.1 (a)

³ Article 48.1 (b)

JPLG is the United Nation’s Joint Programme on Local Governance and Decentralized Service Delivery in Somalia (UN JPLG). It includes five UN institutions⁴, and was established in 2008. The programme has had three distinct phases:

- The first one between April 2008 and December 2012,
- The second from January 2013 to June 2018; and
- The third, which has only recently begun from July 2018 - June 2023.

It was financed by a number of bilateral and multilateral donors, such as Norway, Denmark, Sweden, Switzerland, DfID, Peace Building Fund (PBF) and the European Union.

JPLG I, began operating in 2008, and at that time focused principally on Somaliland and Puntland, which had functioning administrations. The second phase (JPLG II), from 2013 to 2018 is the object of this evaluation. The third phase goes from 2018-2023.

1.2 Objectives

First, the objectives of the programme will be described (1.2.1) and secondly describe the objectives of this evaluation (1.2.2)

1.2.1. Objectives of the Programme

Just like the first phase, the overall objective of JPGL II was to promote improvements in local governance quality that “could contribute to peace consolidation, development and equitable service delivery” at a time when trust in government structures at both central and local levels was limited, and its legitimacy contested. To achieve this, the programme outcomes were structured around three mutually reinforcing strategies:

- Supporting policy and legislative reforms for functional, fiscal and administrative decentralization that clarify and enhance the role of local government, its relationship to central government, and as a means to improve local service delivery;
- Improving local government capacity for equitable service delivery;
- Improving and expanding the delivery of sustainable services to citizens in an equitable, responsive and socially accountable manner and promoting local economic environment.

The programme had additionally a number of cross cutting objectives, namely:

- Reducing gender discrimination and social exclusion and promoting Gender Equality and Women Empowerment (GEWE);
- Promoting human rights by expanding voice and accountability at the local level of government.

1.2.2 Objective and Scope of the Evaluation

The terms of reference for the final evaluation are included in annex 1 of this report. The evaluation occurs almost a year into the third phase of the programme. Extensive discussions regarding the programme, its achievement

⁴ The Five Institutions are ILO, UNHABITAT, UNCDF, UNDP and UNICEF.

and its failures has occurred over the period of 2015-2017 and a number of perceived shortcomings were addressed in the design of the third phase. Accordingly, the evaluation represents an opportunity to ensure that lessons from the second phase can be used to strengthen the operation of the third phase.

The evaluation will assess the overall impact of the second phase of the programme focusing on relevance, effectiveness, efficiency and inclusion of the JPLG. The evaluation will provide recommendations based on the current working environment to ensure continued relevance and sustainability.

1.3 Structure of the Evaluation Report

This final evaluation report is composed of five chapters.

- **Chapter 1** provides the background and context to both the programme (JPLG II) and the evaluation;
- **Chapter 2** describes the methodology used to achieve the evaluation’s intended objectives;
- **Chapter 3** describes in detail the programme and its components
- **Chapter 4** evaluates the programme’s achievements
- **Chapter 5** provides some conclusions and recommendations.

2. Methodology

This evaluation occurred between October 5 and December 5. It was conducted in four steps. Figure 1 describes the process.




Figure 1: Evaluation Methodology

Each of these steps are described below.

2.1 Inception

The objective of the inception phase was to agree with JPLG management the expectations associated with this final evaluation as well as the scope. During the inception phase, the consultant mainly interacted with the programme team to get a good understanding of who the stakeholders are, how they participate in the programme, and what should be considered a priority for the evaluation.

2.2 Information Gathering

Since our capacity to evaluate the programme depended on the quality and quantity of information available to carry out such an evaluation, we dedicated significant effort to acquire first and secondhand information through multiple sources, using multiple tools. The information gathering process is described in Figure 2 below.

Written Documentation Gathering



Figure 2: The information gathering process

The programme is complex, there are multiple organizations participating and there is division of labor among them. Each of these organizations has their information base and their repository for information. There has been significant staff turnover, so that being able to collect data from all of them was a difficult endeavor.

Data and Qualitative Information Collection.

information was gathered from the programme team, as well as institutions participating in the joint programme, as each of these institutions maintains separate data files.

Semi-structured interviews

The consultant met with stakeholders and carried out semi-structured interviews. In addition to meeting the central government authorities in Mogadishu, Garowe and Hargeisa, the consultant conducted a number of site visits to engage with the direct beneficiaries of the programme.

Focus Groups

The consultant met with district councils and municipal councils as a group and discussed with them the programme and the progress that it has achieved. Meeting the whole council together, and subsequently triangulating some of the findings of the individual interviews enabled to cross checks certain information received and ascertain their importance in the grand scheme of the programme.

Online Surveys

Online surveys were created to try to acquire information from individuals directly implicated in the programme. We queried all JPLG staff past and present about the programme and its achievements. The findings of the online survey are included as an annex to this evaluation. The evaluator prepared an online questionnaire targeting specifically beneficiaries of the programme.

However, there was not sufficient time in the course of the mission to translate the document into Somali. Nonetheless this tool can be used in the future by the programme team to get direct feedback from beneficiaries.

2.3 Analysis and Recommendations

The consultant subsequently analyzed the information gathered. The results of the analysis will be discussed in detail in chapter 4 of this evaluation report. An initial presentation of the findings of the evaluation was carried out on November 13 with the donors involved in the programme and on November 14 with management and technical teams of the different participating organizations.

3. Description of JPLG II

In this chapter the evaluator describes his understanding of the programme, its outputs and the expected outcomes and also his understanding of its implementation history.

3.1 Description of outcomes and outputs

The programme document describes the overall objective of JPLG II as “to promote local governance as a tool to cement peace, development and equitable service delivery.” It is derived by the finding that in places where there is a functioning local governance system, citizen confidence and trust in government and therefore legitimacy of the State institutions is increased, reducing the opportunities for harmful organizations to infiltrate the community and therefore consolidating peace and security. Based on that assumption, JPLG was seeking to achieve three outcomes:

- Strengthening policy and legal frameworks surrounding decentralization
- Strengthening capacity of local authorities
- Improving the delivery of public services

In order to achieve each of these outcomes, the programme focused on carrying out a number of activities, as shown in Figure 3




Figure 3: Outcomes and Outputs, JPLG II. (Source- Programme Document)

3.1.1 JPLG II Desired Outcomes

The programme identified three key reform outcomes:

- **Outcome One** focused on designing and strengthening policy and legal frameworks for decentralization across Somaliland and FMS by creating a legal framework for such activity in the Federal Government and new FMS while improving current laws on decentralization in Somaliland and Puntland.
- **Outcome Two** focused on improving the capacity of most local authorities in Somalia by providing training and technical support covering basic elements of local administration, improving coordination between districts and the center, increasing locally generated revenues and strengthening the role and coverage of the Local Development Fund⁵.
- **Outcome Three** focused on improving the delivery of local services.

3.1.2 JPLG II Desired Outputs

Outcome 1: Improving Policy and Legal Frameworks

JPLG II sought to address three main components of decentralization with the aim of clarifying the legal framework for local government efforts to improve the delivery of public services: functional decentralization, fiscal decentralization, and administrative decentralization.

⁵ The local development fund is a mechanism designed under the previous phase of the programme to finance infrastructure improvements in places where reforms are taking place.

Functional Decentralization

JPLG II provided policy support to the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) and the Government of Somaliland by assisting central ministries most closely involved with the decentralization process work out how they will engage with local governments⁶ and codify this into laws, procedures and regulations.

Fiscal Decentralization

JPLG II assisted governments to draft and implement policies, laws and supporting regulations governing the allocation of fiscal resources among central and local governments. Additionally, the programme assisted authorities in drafting a Decentralization Strategies for Somaliland and Puntland and developing decentralization strategies for devolved functions⁷. These efforts were meant to be related to ongoing reforms for Public Financial Management (PFM). The programme especially focused on codifying the sharing of revenue between central (Federal Member States level) and local governments, defining own-source revenues such as tax revenues, fiscal transfers from the center and defining what constitutes property and business taxes. This task entailed drawing up criteria and a formula for the allocation of fiscal transfers to local governments to enable them to perform devolved functions. Another component of this work entailed designing appropriate measures to finance sectoral plans, particularly the Service Delivery Models (SDM) in education, health, WASH, SWM and for roads.

Administrative Decentralization

The programme supported institutions in carrying out actions to ensure successful decentralization. Accordingly, the programme assisted local authorities in designing and implementing the organizational structure of local administrations and their departments, and in defining how these relate to central line agencies and their regional offices.

During Phase II, the programme additionally provided technical support on policies and laws related to the management of local government human resources by assisting in the formulation and drafting of proposals to enhance the status of local government personnel in alignment with minimum labor standards and broader civil service reforms.

Finally, JPLG II continued assisting local governments plan, control and administer land by assisting relevant ministries and agencies of central government to draft policies and legislation to clarify roles, responsibilities and procedures in addressing land governance. In addition, the programme assisted in formulating strategies, work plans and guidelines to implement policies and supporting legislation once these have been enacted and to develop the capacity of Local Governments to implement selected elements of land governance.

Outcome 2: Capacity Development

To develop the capacity of institutions and human resources of central and local government, Phase II concentrated on three main tasks: (i) developing and strengthening structures and systems for good local governance and equitable service delivery; (ii) developing the competence of local authorities for good local governance and equitable service delivery; and (iii) strengthening and expanding fiscal arrangements for service delivery and local investments.

Systems for Local Governance

JPLG II focused on developing and upgrading the Public Expenditure Management (PEM) guidelines and procedures designed under JPLG I to incorporate lessons learned during the first phase and to enhance potential for promoting

⁶ JPLG focused worked in particular with Ministries of Interior, Planning, Finance, Women, Health, Education, Water and Public Works

⁷ Devolved functions are health, education, roads and natural resource management.

inclusive and sustainable Local Economic Development (LED) and gender equitable development. To do so, the programme focused on:

- (i) Strengthening district coordination with deconcentrated central government ministries, particularly the regional offices of MOP, MOI and MOF and other relevant line ministries such as MOE, MOH and MPW.
- (ii) Assisting local governments develop District Development Frameworks (DDF),
- (iii) Aligning District Development Frameworks (DDF) with sectoral plans and National Development Plans (NDP),
- (iv) Exploring ways to strengthen gender inclusion in the planning process.

Competencies for Local Governance

JPLG II assisted in building a cadre of more professional LG staff by collaborating, creating or strengthening institutions capable of providing quality training to local level staff. Additionally, the programme developed organigrams for local government agencies, TORs, competency and performance requirements for job categories, conducted skills assessments based on these requirements, and worked with local institutions to develop capacity development packages tailored to the needs of functional categories of local administration staff. JPLG II also designed and put in place a system for assessing the impact of JPLG in training and capacity development. The programme revised the scope and content of training materials and capacity development activities to better reflect the context and characteristics of the people and institutions to be served. Finally, the programme financed the recruitment of Young Graduates (YG) and technical consultants to build the capacity of local administrations, transfer knowledge of good practices and providing technical guidance and mentoring of local government staff as well as support for local governments technical staff.

Revenue Generation

To support the governments needs to generate or attract additional revenue, the programme focused on three activities

- (i) clarifying sources of revenue and including them in the local government budgets,
- (ii) identifying new sources of revenue and
- (iii) strengthening fiduciary systems to encourage additional international community involvement.

JPLG established procedures to obtain better information on supplementary resources and to reflect these in local plans and budgets. Furthermore, the programme assisted districts and municipalities to develop and set up effective and efficient systems, procedures and techniques for revenue planning, collection and accounting to minimize losses in revenue collection and to tap into underutilized sources of revenues.

Since land ownership is a key element of revenue generation for both the citizen and the local districts, the programme worked to clarify land ownership issues through the creation of a land dispute resolution system.

Additionally, JPLG II assisted municipalities and districts to enhance the generation and collection of revenues from their own sources. JPLG continued financing activities under the Local Development Fund (LDF), a joint donor/government development programme which provides annual financial support to local authorities in the form of block grants that local governments use for a range of approved projects identified through community consultations mechanisms. Finally, the programme encouraged private sector involvement to encourage the development of economic activities capable of generating new revenues for the municipalities.

Outcome 3: Service Delivery

JPLG II strengthened and expanded the capacity of Local Governments (LG) to deliver quality services to their constituents. To do so, it engaged more directly with central governments and non-state actors to improving

the delivery and quality of services. Secondly, it worked to enhance the enabling environment for local economic development through local governance. Thirdly, it promoted responsive governance and improved service delivery through enhanced social accountability mechanisms.

Engagement with Central Government and Non-State Actors

Because service delivery, in the absence of a functioning government was taken up by multiple agents, the programme designed service delivery models (SDMs) for devolved services which lay out norms, models and practices in line with preferred standards of good governance in each sector. These included procedures and mechanisms to encourage equitable access, sustainability, accountability and value for money and clarified the roles that the central government, local governments, international NGOs and communities are each responsible for. SDMs were implemented on a pilot basis in a few districts to test the model's adequacy and determine sustainability of the proposed devolution.

Creating an enabling environment for Local Economic Development

JPLG II assisted LGs to assess the feasibility of forming public-private partnerships (PPPs) between government and the private sector in delivering services and stimulating local economic development. Accordingly, it finalized a PPP policy framework and drafted institutional and legislative frameworks for PPPs. The programme additionally supported inter-ministerial working-groups on the subject in Somaliland and Puntland.

JPLG II also worked to create a business-friendly environment by focusing on the local councils and persuading them not to levy arbitrary taxes and fees and act to minimize extraneous costs on business activity. Where local authorities had sufficient capital, JPLG II provided technical advice on potential investments in economic infrastructure to reduce the costs of production and transport.

Enhance Social Accountability

JPLG II provided training modules on conflict resolution, civic education and local elections to ensure transparent elections of council representatives and the appointment of the mayor or district commissioner, whether through direct election or by vote of council members, and the prompt publication of results. In terms of planning and budgeting, JPLG II worked to enhance social accountability by improving procedures for citizens and beneficiaries to participate in the process by encouraging public meetings before the start of the fiscal year to review proposed plans and later after the close of the fiscal year to review progress in implementing plans and to assess actual expenditures against earlier budgets.

To ensure accountability, JPLG II encouraged community members to play a more active role at each stage of the programme cycle inter alia through the use of enhanced community monitoring systems.

3.2 JPLG Principles of Engagement, Management Structure and Target Audience

The JPLG II programme had stringent principles of engagement, a very focused geographic scope of activity and a complex management structure as described in more detail below.

3.2.1 Principles of Engagement

In approaching its work in Somalia, JPLG II focused on incorporating good practices from programmes carried out in fragile and conflict affected areas⁸. This led the programme to focus on creating an environment suitable

⁸ Principles for engaging in fragile states include (i) take the context as the starting point, (ii) focus on state building as the central objective, (iii) do no harm, (iv) act fast and stay engaged (v) Harmonize processes and practices for more effective programme delivery and (vi) Ensure effective coordination mechanisms to

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for decentralization by, for example, facilitating the relationships between central and local governments to smoothen the process of decentralization, attempt to stabilize local government revenues through the use of LDFs, encourage participating agencies to maintain a common approach to the hiring and management of staff.

Most importantly, the programme had clear minimum criteria for engagement with districts, including:

- The district should be stable and not within territory that is subject to disputed control or authority;
- Central government in the relevant zone must agree to the best of their ability to maintain safety and security in the district to permit programme operations;
- The district must be one recognized as such in 1991 at the time of the fall of the Siad Barre regime;
- A legitimate local council recognized by central government must already be established in the district as the client and recipient of JPLG support;
- Central government in the relevant jurisdiction must formally approve JPLG intervention in the district;
- The district administration must be capable of performing basic tasks, such as planning, budgeting, financial management and delivery of some services.

This process allowed the programme to prioritize and sequence interventions as well as to gauge ownership of the process.

3.2.2. Management Structure

The Joint Programme comprises five UN Agencies with complementary experience around the same objective. Box 1 describes the role that each of these plays. The management structure of JPLG includes a multitude of levels. Figure 2 shows the management structure of the programme.

- A Joint **Programme Steering Committee (JSC)** composed of governments, heads of the participating agencies and donors provided strategic guidance and oversight to the Programme. Additionally, it approved workplans and budgets and reviewed progress towards achieving Programme goals, facilitated collaboration among the UN partners in the Programme, and ensured the Programme is responsive to the priorities of governments. It generally met about once a year.
- The **Programme Management Group (PMG)** which included the heads of participating UN agencies was chaired by the agency heads on rotation with the PMU in a secretariat role. Its main function was to advise and guide the programme on management of JPLG in a coordinated and harmonized manner. In addition, the PMG was responsible for assessing the performance of the Senior Programme Manager.
- In ensuring coordination between the activities of the different agencies, the Programme Management group was assisted by a **Technical Working Group (TWG)** which included the JPLG Programme / Project Managers from each of the five UN partner agencies and the PMU. Under JPLG II, the TWG was responsible for delivery of their mandates within the programme and day-to-day implementation of programme activities such as drafting, managing, implementing the annual work plans and budgets. It helped devise policies and strategies relating to technical aspects of JPLG activities and to review, the design or revise guidelines for specific components of the Joint Programme.
- The **Programme Management Unit (PMU)** was responsible for the day to day operation and strategic oversight of the programme as well as ensuring programme coherence. It facilitated the preparation of

ensure efficient and effective implementation,

Annual Work Plans and Budgets for the programmes in conjunction with the agencies and facilitated the coordination among the five UN Agencies. Additionally, the PMU monitored and evaluated programme components, budgets and prepared periodic progress reports and made arrangements for the Mid Term Review, the end of term evaluation of the Programme and represented the programme to donors, including mobilizing funds. The PMU also prepared both internal and external communication materials and is the focal point of the programme with governments, donors and other stakeholders. The PMU did not manage programme funds, nor did it oversee technical staff. Each participating organization is transferred funds to carry out its activities and has accountability for the resources received and the programmatic areas agreed upon. Each is responsible for its own portfolio of programmes, budget and work plan, partnership arrangements and corresponding legal documents or contracts, and minor budget revisions as per its own rules, regulations and directives. Programme / Project Managers from each of the participating agency report to their respective Agency supervisor on technical and programming issues with a dotted reporting line to the Senior Programme Manager.

The programme sought to expand the foot presence of the agencies in the FMS and Somaliland. Accordingly, it posted senior technical staffs/consultants in the areas in which it operated. JPLG had teams in Somaliland, the FMS comprised of one or two technical staff from each of the five UN Partners and sometimes an administrative assistant. These agency staff were responsible for the implementation and coordination of the respective agency's activities that fall under the JPLG AWPB and report to their Programme / Project Manager. To facilitate coordination, the PMU also had field officers (Team Leader and M&E Officers) in Somaliland, Puntland and Mogadishu for liaison, coordination and monitoring. Members of each team were expected to provide more or less full-time support to JPLG but are also often required to contribute to other agency tasks.

Broadly summarized the roles and activities carried out by UN Agencies were:

- ILO focused on assisting local governments in the area of public works, procurement, Public-Private Partnerships, and local economic development
- UNCDF for fiscal decentralization policy reforms, local revenue improvements and local development funds,
- UNDP for policy, administrative reforms and core capacity development for local governments and gender;
- UN Habitat for municipal finance, urban planning and land governance
- UNICEF for participation, social accountability, access to services and gender inclusion

Box 1: Role of Participating UN Agencies in JPLG II




Figure 4: JPLG II Management Structure

3.2.3 Areas of Engagement

The programme started and focused in Puntland and Somaliland during JPLG I. This focus was due to the instability of other parts of Somalia and the absence of the political basis for constructive engagement. The situation changed in August 2012 when the Provisional Constitution of the Republic of Somalia was adopted. This development coincided with the end of JPLG I and occurred during the preparation of JPLG II. It was expected, accordingly that JPLG would extend its geographical reach to include more systematically the new FMS.

In Somaliland JPLG provided assistance to 8 districts⁹, mainly in large urban areas. In Puntland, JPLG II provided assistance to 9 districts. JPLG support also focused on assisting the Ministry of Interior of the FGS and carrying out basic local governance interventions and rehabilitation work principally in the Banadir Regional Administration (BRA), Jubbaland and the South West States as well as Adado district in Galmudug State.

⁹ In Somaliland, the districts concerned were Berbera, Borama, Burao, Gabiley, Hargeisa, Odweine, Sheikh and Zeyla and in Puntland they include Bossaso, Gardo, Garowe, Galkayo, Bandarbeyla, Eyl, Jariban, Burtinle and Galdogob.




Figure 5: JPLG Areas of Intervention - Source 2017 Annual Report

3.2.4 Beneficiaries

In JPLG II's direct beneficiaries were:


- District councils and administrations, village councils, communities, and the private sector in rural and urban areas;
- Central government authorities including:
 - Ministries in charge of Interior, Finance, Planning, Women, Health, Education, Water and Public Works;

The ultimate beneficiaries were the populations of the districts who would benefit through increased and better delivery of basic services.

4. Programme Implementation

Implementation of the programme occurred over a period of five and ½ years, with the programme’s activities being focused mainly in Somaliland and Puntland.

4.1 Summary of Programme Costs and Disbursements



The programme document listed a budget of US\$145M. This budget, however, was described as “aspirational”. In fact, JPLG II received a little over US\$88 million dollars over the life of the programme. Its allocation varied significantly from year to year, with budgets for the years only being clear at the beginning of the year. The programme disbursed on average 17 million dollars a year, with the lowest amount being spent in 2013 (USD11M) (a transition year) and the highest amount being spent in 2016 (23 Million). The drop in 2017 was explained as occasioned by lack of new LDF projects in that year. The variance in spending year to year was significant, varying on average by approximately 28% from one year to the next.

Figure 6: JPLG Disbursements 2013-2017

The programme does not keep track of programme disbursements by activities, districts or state, although given the functional repartition of the work between the agencies, this can be inferred. Overall the money was evenly allocated between ILO, UNHABITAT, UNDP and UNCDF. UNICEF received about 10% of total proceeds.




Figure 7: Total Programme Allocation by Agency

4.2 Assessment of Programme Achievements



Figure 8: Overall Programme Evaluation

is described in Figure 8.

Relevance: High

The programme is highly relevant. Somalia, beyond Mogadishu, did not historically benefit from the modern state. In places where modern institutions had not been functional, populations relied on traditional institutions, and this institutional gap is one of the motivations for the rise of Al Shabab¹¹ to fill in the gap. Focusing institutional development efforts in places outside of Mogadishu is sensible to strengthen the basis for peace and stability. The merit of the program is to have focused on developing transparent accountability systems on top of the traditional reconstruction agenda. The programme provides tangible benefits to local citizens, especially in those areas where neither the central government nor the donors have been effectively carrying out their basic service delivery functions.

Impact: Substantial

The programme has supported the development of institutions and infrastructure in places where both were missing. Overall, the support has especially been impactful in places capable of generating resources and in which small but well targeted intervention could have a catalytic effect in terms of social impact, private sector development or revenue generation for the district. This has allowed local populations to benefit from basic services to which previously they had no access and has been a catalyst for additional private sector activity. The programme's inputs are appreciated by local populations and elected officials.

Efficiency and Effectiveness: Moderate

The programme was rated *Moderately Efficient and Moderately Effective*, noting that these types of effort in fragile and conflict-affected areas are extremely personnel intensive and achieving efficiency and effectiveness is a complicated endeavor. The evaluation further noted that, as the situation on the ground evolves very quickly,

This chapter provides an assessment of the programme's performance over the period under review. The program was rated along a four-point system¹⁰, except for impact which was rated on a two-point scale.

The overall, rating of the programme is *Moderately Satisfactory*.

The reasoning and corroborating information that was used to reach this conclusion is described in more detail below.

The programme was first evaluated with regards to Relevance, Effectiveness, Efficiency and Impact and subsequently through a detailed evaluation of the programme and its components.

4.1.1 Overall Evaluation

The programme is rated along four dimensions: relevance, effectiveness, efficiency and impact. The summary of the findings

¹⁰ The program was rated along a four-point with Satisfactory and Unsatisfactory being the highest and lowest rating.

¹¹ The institutional gap led to the establishment of Islamic Courts and AS was just an armed wing of the IC. Although they collect taxes and have courts, the group describes itself as waging jihad against the enemies of Islam

programmes have difficulty carrying out normal planning and budgeting. Nonetheless, as discussed further in subsequent sections, the programme has structural issues which have hampered its ability to improve efficiency and effectiveness.

4.2.2 Operational Evaluation

Criteria	Rating
Quality at Entry	Satisfactory
Implementation	Moderately Satisfactory
Output 1:	Satisfactory.
Output 2:	Moderately Satisfactory
Output 3:	Moderately Satisfactory
Cross Cutting Issues	Moderately Unsatisfactory
Programme Management	Moderately Unsatisfactory
Monitoring and Evaluation	Unsatisfactory
Sustainability	Moderately Likely
Value for Money	Undetermined
Overall	Moderately Satisfactory

The programme was evaluated across different dimensions to attempt to thoroughly understand its performance over the period under study. The criteria used were:

- Quality at Entry
- Implementation
- Monitoring and Evaluation
- Programme Management
- Sustainability
- Value for Money

Table 1 offers a glimpse of the ratings which are explained in more detail below.

Table 1: JPLG Performance - Overall Evaluation

Quality at Entry: Satisfactory

The programme responded to the government’s need to establish credible institutions across its territory. It has the merit to recognize that reconstruction can only be sustained if it is followed in short order by the development of systems and a visible presence in the territory from formal institutions.

The design was prepared based on the OECD4/ Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States and Situations (FSP), during which developing partners actively engaged to have consensus on practical coordination mechanisms. The programme preparation team, in close consultation with the fiduciary and safeguards colleagues, developed systems to address weaknesses in public financial systems and ensure transparency in programme operations. The programme was designed to ensure ownership by the stakeholders and focused on achieving sustainability.

The design of the programme applied a number of lessons drawn from experience in the previous phase of the programme (JPLG I) as well as lessons learned in PFM and public sector management reforms in other countries that had emerged from conflict and fragility at the time. For example, cognizant of the Somalia context and to avoid the ‘big- bang’ implementation strategy, the conceptual model for Accounting Information Management System (AIMS) and Billing Information Management System (BIMS) established a low cost ‘fit-for-purpose’ bespoke solution.

Other lessons were incorporated from the World Development Report 2011 - Specifically: (i) considering the absence of security, institutional capacity, the programme targeted capacity development as one of the programme’s key pillar; (ii) diaspora Somalis were encouraged to join the government reform implementation team; (iii) technical assistants were embedded into ministries and agencies to provide smooth transfer of skills over the medium-term; and (iv) joint reform oversight mechanisms including broad government stakeholders

and development partners was established to encourage mutual accountability where funding was tracked through government reporting and accountability systems using a common set of performance indicators. Table 2 describes how the lessons learned from Public Sector Management and Public Financial Management Reforms were applied in developing the programme design.

Table 2: Lessons learned from PFM and PSM reforms in fragile environments

Implications and Recommendations from Fragile Country Experience	Related JPLG design features
Consider Country (or area) context (and existing incentives for local stakeholders) systematically in deciding if, how and when to intervene to strengthen institutions	JPLG assessment of district capacity and development of a rating system addresses country context. Engagement model provides transparent basis to determine when to intervene
Development partners have an opportunity to use aid allocations and aid modalities in ways that incentivize the development of sound systems to manage both human and financial resources.	Requiring districts to develop functioning AIMS and BIMS ahead of LDF financing. Use of procurement system to carry out civil works.
Developing clear reform plans based on emerging analysis and periodic updating of such plans will help ensure that the engagement approach and the provision of support are pertinent, strategic and focused	The programme promotes the design and use of Service Delivery Models as frameworks to rationally and sustainably devolve responsibilities to local governments
There are distinct reform challenges and opportunities as institutions evolve and mature and expectation rise.	Sequencing of interventions is a way to address the different circumstances of districts and regions. The idea of a “reduced intervention” even if not all criteria for intervention are met attempt to recognize the heterogeneity of districts across Somaliland and FMS
Legal and institutional reforms are an integral part of strengthening PFM systems in post-conflict environments, but there is less of a need to front-load these reforms than has been suggested by previous analysis.	The programme places a lot of attention to the development of legal frameworks. It envisages the adoption of interim measures in the absence of such frameworks
Strengthening capacity development requires a phased and layered approach that includes addressing capacity constraints in the short term as well as pursuing longer-term improvements.	The programme provides for direct assistance to districts and central governments agencies to address immediate requirements. It focuses on developing capacity of training institutes to address medium and long-term needs of district administrators and council members.
Development partners and governments should consider monitoring tools that complement each other to provide a stronger focus on results chains and on the impact of devolution and improved systems on service delivery and state building.	The programme envisages multiple monitoring tools which together can provide information on impact

Taking into account Somalia’s institutional challenges, the overall risk rating for the programme was high. The

programme design correctly identified these risks and attempted to take them into account in programme design by identifying mitigating measures, although as we will see in later chapters, they were not always very successful. Government and stakeholder ownership of the programme at entry was strong, especially in Somaliland and Puntland.

Implementation: Moderately Satisfactory

The results across components are uneven but overall it seems that the programme assisted the development of those districts in which it operated. The programme became effective on January 1, 2013. As this was the second phase of an existing programme, it was immediately ready for implementation.

The quality and success of programme implementation varied through the duration of the programme, most notably due to unpredictable availability of donor financing and frequent and significant changes in staffing. Despite these challenges the programme maintained operational performance. The programme's workplans were implemented with 100 percent disbursement at programme closure. This, in part, reflects the financing model in which donors determined the amount of funding they could provide on a year to year basis. The lack of predictability in programme funding affected the capacity of the programme to adequately plan interventions that required a more sustained support. The fiduciary performance of the programme appears satisfactory.

A Mid-Term Review of the programme was carried out in 2015, which was critical of the programme and its implementation. Its key findings are relayed verbatim in Box 2. The mid-term review gave rise to a lengthy and thorough review of the programme and its organization and significant adjustments to programme design in anticipation of JPLG III.

Progress of the Program

JPLG II consists of three outcome areas which focus on policy, capacity development and service delivery. Progress and good practices were noted particularly around the passing of decentralization policies in both Puntland and Somaliland, the roll out of Service Delivery Mechanisms and the activities of the Local Development Fund. However, there was also little progress in passing the Fiscal Decentralization Act, gaps in the monitoring of capacity development activities and a lack of evidence around Local Economic Development activities.

Effectiveness of joint programming

The JPLG concept retains broad support. Government counterparts expressed a high degree of ownership and cited improved coordination even if there were 'transaction costs' associated with engaging five UN agencies separately within a Joint Program. However, the confidence of donors in particular has been affected by serious management challenges. Furthermore, the management of the funding modality may not have incentivized performance and may even have encouraged the pattern of carrying-over funds. The prolonged absence of a Senior Manager and the limited engagement of the Steering Committee are key areas of concerns.

Monitoring and Evaluation

Improvements have been made to JPLG II's M&E system including the revision of its log frame and filling gaps in staffing. However, a much sharper focus on the link between activities, outputs and outcomes is required. This will require further elaboration of the theory of change that underpins JPLG II interventions. There are opportunities to collect more outcome data, particularly around the Local Development Fund and capacity development activities. There is also scope for JPLG II to build M&E capacity at Local Government level.

Value for money and transaction costs

It is difficult to judge the value for money (VfM) provided by JPLG II as the Program does not report actual expenditure against its Annual Work Plan Budget and there is limited outcome data. However, there are opportunities to improve the measurement of VfM indicators, especially concerning construction work. Analysis undertaken with JPLG II suggests high running costs even if international staff salaries are reduced or removed. Furthermore, transaction costs appear high for donors and moderate for both JPLG and government counterparts. This is driven by management gaps, high running costs and carry-over, and the interactions with five separate UN agencies.

Gender

Gender is a cross-cutting theme in JPLG and there is evidence of the participation of women in a cross-section of its activities. The new log frame has also included some gender related indicators. However, gender has a low profile within the Annual Work Plan and there is no coherent strategy for integrating gender into the overall Program approach. Gaps in gender disaggregated data for women persist, including at the outcome level.

Sustainability and expansion

While there is evidence of JPLG II systems being institutionalized and governments investing their own funds in JPLG II activities, there is no clear sustainability or exit strategy. Furthermore, good examples are not sufficient in number to result in confidence regarding the overall direction of travel. There are too few examples of the expansion or use of the JPLG model in the complete absence of JPLG II funds. With regard to planning its expansion, a clear strategy has not yet been developed. It should be noted that when designing this strategy, JPLG II cannot draw on a robust evidence base of what has worked well in its work to date in Puntland and Somaliland due to its weak M&E system.

Outcome 1: Policy

JPLG II addressed three aspects of decentralization which are outlined in Table 3. There have been notable achievements, particularly the agreement of decentralization policies in Puntland and Somaliland in 2014. These positive outcomes have led the evaluation to rate Output 1 as satisfactory.

Output	Rating
Output 1.1: Policies, laws and strategies for decentralization are drafted and implemented that clarify the division of functional responsibilities among central, regional and local Government	Satisfactory
Output 1.2: Policies, laws and supporting regulations are drafted and implemented that govern the allocation of fiscal resources between central and local governments in line with their responsibilities	Satisfactory
Output 1.3: Policies, laws and supporting frameworks for decentralization are drafted and implemented that address government administration, local government employment and land governance	Moderately Satisfactory
Overall Rating	Satisfactory

Table 3: Rating Outcome 1: Policy

The programme during the period of implementation successfully designed and rolled out Decentralization Policies for the Governments of Somaliland and Puntland. These policies gave District Councils the authority to deliver selected services in priority areas of education, health, water, sanitation and roads. The District Councils also make decisions on planning, finance and human resources. The programme additionally developed Strategies, decentralization roadmaps, fiscal decentralization strategies and action plans and Revenue Mobilization Action Plans.

Roll-out of the policies and strategies was time consuming, as overall the whole concept of decentralization was new to government counterparts. Moreover, it required some coordination between different agencies in government to effectively carry it out. Accordingly, the programme identified the Vice Presidents of Somaliland and Puntland as 'decentralization and local governance champions' and supported the establishment of the Inter-Ministerial Committees on Local Government in 2013.

The allocation of fiscal resources remains a challenge, especially in Puntland, although some tangible progress was made during the period of implementation of the programme, as a result the devolution of activities to the local governments has been slow. Assistance to the structuring of local councils and local administrations was effectively delivered, with the majority of supported districts showing steady improvements in putting the foundations in place for a transparent local government.

The programme also supported the creation of Local Government Associations, a forum of local government elected officials which works as a mean to improve the communication between local and central governments. In Somaliland, this initiative has had some success and the LGA is working effectively. The association is now charging fees to members and by doing so has become 100% self-sufficient. In Puntland, the LGA is still very much work in progress.

Outcome 2: Capacity Development

JPLG II focused on improving local government capacity for equitable service delivery. Overall, the programme managed to introduce systems to improve efficient management of the districts limited resources, and to work with select governments who have the capacity to generate revenues to find ways to improve revenues and

worked to improve the knowledge and capacity of local government staff. However, these systems are yet to be used by local government administrations to inform policymaking and the capacity development activities have had limited success. This has led to output 2 being rated as *moderately satisfactory*.

Output	Rating
Output 2.1: Structures and systems for good governance, planning and budgeting is established and strengthened.	Moderately Satisfactory
Output 2.2: Competencies and skills are developed for good local governance and equitable service delivery.	Moderately Satisfactory
Output 2.3: Fiscal arrangements including local revenue generation and the LDF are strengthened and expanded for service delivery and local investment.	Moderately Satisfactory
Overall Rating	Moderately Satisfactory

JPLG II supported the development of public management systems at the district level to enable service delivery that is effective, accountable and transparent. In this context, they focused on standardizing and informatizing accounting and billing functions and work to instill appropriate procurement procedures for programme-financed infrastructure projects.

The introduction of AIMS and BIMS has largely been positive. Over time, these systems have strengthened local government employees' abilities both to report financial data more accurately and have been instrumental in increasing the collection of greater revenues from taxes on property and business licensing and instilled a culture of accounting. The value and heritage of these activities is not necessarily in the introduction of the computerized systems, which over time become obsolete, but in bringing in a mind frame on how to account and report about public expenditures and revenues.

As a consequence of nationwide efforts supported by the World Bank and others to standardize PFM practices across Somaliland, Puntland, the FMS and the Federal Government, AIMS and BIMS are being replaced by the Somali Financial Management System (SFMS), which differs in terms of architecture and requirements from AIMS and BIMS. Yet the work carried out by the project in this area will result an asset in facilitating the absorption of the new accounting and reporting practices. The programme has contributed, by its emphasis on using processes and procedures to track government revenues and expenditures has facilitated the work of the World Bank and other partners working on PFM. The program in the next phase can focus on implementing measures to assist local governments to transition from their current systems to SFMS. This will sustain the work undertaken in deploying AIMS and BIMS.

Figures 9 and 10 below highlight the ability of local governments to account for their revenues and expenditures using AIMS and BIMS.




Figure 9: Revenues from Taxation LG in Somaliland




Figure 10: Revenue from Taxation LGs Puntland

Currently, AIMS and BIMS systems are not being used to generate reports that could improve decision making and policy design from local administrators. This indicates that while the processes supported by AIMS and BIMS have gained some legitimacy, local government staff and decision makers have still not understood how that system can benefit them in making better, more informed decisions. Additional focus in strengthening the capacity of finance department staff to exploit the data they have available, and dialogue with local government policy makers to explain how the reports can help their decision-making process can usefully strengthen the capacity of local government staff.

Additionally, procurement guidelines consistent with good international practices were applied for JPLG II-financed projects. Anecdotal evidence suggests that the systems are being used. This is a welcome development that should be carefully monitored by capturing information that enables policy makers and their technical consultants to determine how the process is making an impact. While the evaluator was unable to identify information which would point to a) increased participation over time from a more diverse group of service providers, b) lower implementation costs or c) contestation of procurement decisions -indicators which could describe the impact of this new system in each of the districts, such information should be easily obtainable and could provide great assistance in the definition of next steps in the roll out of such systems.

In terms of capacity development, the programme assisted the strengthening of capacity for local authorities by providing trainings. These training focused on the effective use of systems being implemented, such as the Public Expenditure Management and Participatory Impact Monitoring, but also on basic administration and management skills, such as Human Resource Management.

The programme additionally focused on inputting more qualified staff in the district administration through the deployment of Young Graduates and technical consultants. The evaluator met with both young graduates and technical consultants. Young graduates appear to cherish the opportunity provided by the programme, although the retention level remains low at a little under 20%.

The program also employs technical consultants to assist local governments and sectoral ministries at the central level in carrying out decentralization activities. Many of these consultants have been in place for a relatively long time, raising the question as to whether these consultants are substituting local government staff in conducting administration and management activities or whether they were transferring knowledge and mentoring staff. This is an element that should be carefully monitored, since using technical consultants to carry out public servant jobs is both distortionary in terms of the wage structure and demoralizing to the public servants. Instead,

mentoring and knowledge transfer has been shown to be beneficial in terms of capacity development and empowering in terms of public workforce morale.

In Somaliland the programme supported the establishment of a Local Governance wing at the Civil Service Institute to train future district-level employees ahead of their deployment and during their career. Similar initiatives are being discussed in Puntland, although this is still very much work in progress.

Overall, although no systematic data to evaluate the impact of these activities has been collected, anecdotal evidence suggests that this multifaceted capacity-development strategy for local development staff may be delivering some results. The overall impact of this approach seems to be tempered by frequent turnover in local government staff.

Outcome 3: Local Service Delivery

The objective of this component is to assist local governments actually deliver public services. In doing so, they ensure that local governments are accountable and responsive to community priorities in “providing equitable and sustainable services and promoting local economic development”. This evaluation rates this component as *moderately satisfactory*, principally on account of the fact that local economic development and infrastructure improvements financed by the programme are actually the most visible and appreciated activity of the programme. There is some discussion as to whether the investments in question have actually contributed to governments delivering “improved and more equitable services”

Output	Rating
Output 3.1: Local Governments deliver improved services through enhanced engagement with government and non-state actors.	Satisfactory
Output 2.2: The enabling environment for local economic development is enhanced through local governance.	Moderately Satisfactory
Output 2.3: Good governance and service delivery is improved through enhanced social accountability mechanisms.	Moderately Satisfactory
Overall Rating	Moderately Satisfactory

The activities of this component included assisting local governments conduct urban planning exercises as a basis for efficient construction of infrastructure. Because land is a significant source of conflict, within this process, the programme focused on developing some local conflict management systems to address land issues.

Additionally, local Governments, through JPLG, have delivered needed infrastructure mostly to areas of the country where such infrastructure previously did not exist. The LDF-financed construction of roads, and the rehabilitation of elementary schools and health centers have been well received. Additionally, JPLG also financed the rehabilitation of markets, parks and on occasion sports fields. The programme focused on making sure that investment priorities were defined by the district councils in a participative way and assisted local stakeholders in carrying out consultations which took into account the voice of some marginalized groups. Community Monitoring Groups (CMG) have been created to provide beneficiary feedback relating to the quality and utility of investments.

Overall, there is anecdotal evidence that interventions under this component have been appreciated by the local population, especially those related to infrastructure development. JPLG seems to have acquired recognition among the local stakeholders relating to the quality and transparency of their interventions.

Additionally, Service Delivery Models, especially in education and health have provided a useful framework to define the roles and responsibilities of local and district authorities vis-à-vis the central government. SDMs were rolled in some JPLG-supported districts. Preliminary evidence provided by community scorecards in a small, select pool of districts seems to indicate that populations believe that services in education and health may have improved.

In this case as well, the programme does not measure whether the infrastructure investments have improved service delivery over time, or whether devolving to local government management of certain functions has improved service delivery. The programme requires feasibility studies to be carried out for each investment it finances. The quality of these feasibility studies varies, but the evaluator notes that the economic impact assessment needs to be strengthened in order to provide a suitable baseline for subsequent evaluation of the impact of such investments.

Additionally, the programme requires that local governments agree to sign an agreement which binds them to carry out maintenance on the investments financed by the programme. However, the actual costs of maintenance are not clearly spelled out and there is little oversight as to whether these agreements are being respected. Basic indicators, such as operation and maintenance as a proportion of total or current expenditures are not being kept, despite the fact that data in this area is being collected. Encouraging oversight authorities to keep local governments accountable for the commitments they make should be addressed as a priority issue.

Cross-Cutting Themes

The programme asserts that strengthened institutions at the local level contributed to improved peace and stability and increased the respect of Human Rights. These are sensible assertions which deserve to be studied in assessing the value of this programme to the rehabilitation of the Somali State. There is currently, however, no suitable logical framework nor any information available that directly links the programme to these outcomes to provide any sort of evaluation of these issues.

With regards to gender, there is some evidence that women concerns are being addressed, but the absence of an overarching strategy or even clarity of how gender impact ought to be measured in the context of this programme forces the evaluator to rate its interventions *as Moderately Unsatisfactory*.

Cross-Cutting Issues	Rating
Gender	Moderately Unsatisfactory
Peace and Stability	Undetermined
Human Rights	Undetermined
Overall Rating	Moderately Unsatisfactory

The Programme has a stated objective to address gender equality and women’s empowerment across its activities yet results in this area are limited. The programme has yet to address Gender Inclusion in a consistent manner, based on a logical framework which could easily be explained to local leaders.

The programme puts great emphasis on gender responsive local governance policy development and highlights the successful participation of women in the development of District Development Plans. There is in fact evidence that this has occurred in some districts. The programme has also focused on encouraging the inclusion of women

in local councils where allocative decisions are being made. Here too, while not uniformly, and not as fast as had been anticipated, there is some evidence that as a result of the programme and its interventions some communities have increased women participation in local councils.

However, the programme is much less clear in its approach of how to ensure that women get improved access to basic services or whether the access to these services, when it occurs, has improved their situation. First and foremost, the programme does not capture the extent to which District Development Plans have actually incorporated the concerns of women. Secondly, it fails to determine how each intervention has impacted the access of women to services, which is at the basis of increased mainstreaming and opportunities for this group.

The lack of clarity and monitoring of results on issues of gender access to service delivery is an indication of the ambivalence of the programme vis-à-vis Gender-focused activities. If this programme is about ensuring improved and more equitable access to government services, then the focus should be on this issue. If this is a governance process, then gender mainstreaming should be emphasized in terms of representation in local instances. It can also focus on both, although it needs to present suitable arguments as to how it intends to carry out this agenda. As it stands, the programme advocates for neither and its approach to this issue is unfocused and haphazard.

The programme has tried, over the course of implementation, to be more focused and systematic in addressing women concerns. For example, feasibility studies for LDF interventions include a study of the impact of the proposed investments on women, but here again, there is no attempt to follow up and determine whether the expected impacts identified in the feasibility studies are actually becoming reality. As a result, the evaluator could find no evidence that this concern translated successfully in improved actions.

Programme Management: Moderately Unsatisfactory

As described in section 3.2.2. the management infrastructure of the programme is rather complex, and this complexity is due to the nature of the relationship between different UN Agencies. The programme navigates the complexity to deliver effective management to the programme. It remarkably succeeds to maintain some order in terms of programme activities, but the current set up remains inefficient hence the rating of programme management as *Moderately Unsatisfactory*.

While the UN system is singularly qualified to deliver on the programme's promises and the joint programming approach is an appropriate model for the implementation of cross-sectoral, multi-dimensional interventions, the programme management can only work if the combined actions of the members deliver better than each member of the programme by itself. This requires unity of purpose and willingness to pool resources appropriately. In this case neither financial nor human resources are pooled, instead they remain within the control of each agency. The PMU, the face of the programme, does not have any responsibility in management of programme staff, and therefore limited ability to steer the programme during the course of implementation.

In the context of a joint programme, the relationship between participating members should be equal and agreements must be reached by consensus. Under this system, the coordination of activities and unity of purposes is achieved with difficulty and requires significant consultation. Obtaining a consensus on required management actions in the end is often achieved, but the process is slow and bureaucratic. This bureaucracy entails significant transaction cost to UN Agencies, the donors who fund the programme and most importantly to the governments the programme is supposed to assist. The latter have complained about high transaction costs for the clients who must sign implementation agreements with each agency and with the programme and reduce the capacity of the programme to effectively monitor quality and programme impact.

Moreover, a programme which works in a rapidly evolving environment must be flexible. Since the complexity of the JPLG management structure is significant, the capacity of the programme to adjust rapidly to changing circumstances is reduced and this may have repercussions, especially as the programme moves more intensely into the new FMS.

Some operational concerns that are specific to the programme also affected its performance. For example, the JPSC and the PMG have had difficulty providing direction and guidance for the programme. The Technical Working Group has been unable to fill the gap as it's not been delegated sufficient authority to make decisions on behalf of the programme. As a result, the programme opts for a more formalistic approach.

Monitoring and Evaluation: Unsatisfactory

M&E appears to be the weakest part of the programme and its implementation. This is not an assessment of the quality of individuals working on M&E but more about the systemic approach that is being used to carry out this function. This conclusion was reached after reviewing all available monitoring reports and having consulted extensively with staff and beneficiaries.

JPLG is a programme which focuses on trying new approaches and methods to develop governance structures in this very difficult environment. Its greatest value added is that, as a result of the strong reputation it has acquired with the stakeholders, it's capable of proposing new approaches and experiment with different types of engagement. This experimentation can only occur if the programme is capable to gather information to determine the success or failure of its initiatives. This requires a very performing Monitoring and Evaluation system which is actually measuring the right things. Yet the project consistently underfunded the M&E function, which reduced the ability of staff to carry it out successfully.

At Mid-term, the log frame was revised and simpler indicators which were better aligned to agency reporting and JPLG II interventions were selected. The midterm report discussed the development of a management Information System (MIS) to strengthen the implementation of M&E Functions and proposed the development of a website to act as a recipient of information.

A website of the programme, which acts as a repository of programme information is up and running, but it has not been updated since Q4 of 2016. Little visible changes appear to have occurred in this area between the mid-term review and the end of the programme, although some of the concerns have been taken into account in JPLG III.

The indicators identified do not adequately demonstrate the results that are expected in this type of programme. Moreover, reporting is uneven and partial. It primarily focuses on the delivery of activities and there seems to be no real attempt to quantify and evaluate outcomes even in the rare cases where data which could actually assist in evaluating it actually exists. Reporting does not seem to follow a harmonized format which can be used by all agencies working on the programme. Instead each agency reports accordingly to its criteria and standards. Documents are shared but not consistently.

Monitoring and Evaluation is not the sole responsibility of the programme. In fact, accurate reporting can only occur if the districts cooperate with programme management to systematically gather the required information. This should be a precondition to access to the LDF and this will likely require district policy makers and staff be sensitized to the need for this information and on how to carry this function out. Currently, programme

beneficiaries are not required to gather information.

With regards to the LDF, feasibility studies provide a cost benefit-analysis which has information that could be used to establish baselines and conduct M&E, yet this is not done. Yet, while the cost-benefit analysis is a good start, it should be improved in order to provide an improved basis for the evaluation of the impact of the programme. The evaluator suggests enhancing the feasibility studies by including an estimate of the expected impact of the investment. Even after the implementation of activities and the actual infrastructure construction, there should be a systematic monitoring of the results against those estimates both by the programme and the beneficiaries.

The programme included three full-time M&E staff (Hargeisa, Garowe and Mogadishu). It is unclear what their role was. This has been rationalized in JPLG III. It is unclear whether the third-party evaluations which were proposed in the programme document were actually implemented.

Value for Money: Undetermined

The Mid-term review focused on Value for Money at length and concluded that the information base to conduct a suitable value for money analysis was not available. This still appears to be the case. The way the annual plans are designed and how information about resource allocation is collected in the context of programme monitoring and evaluation prevent the correlation of costs with programme activities. Accordingly, the evaluator concurs with the mid-term review that VfM analysis cannot be conducted fairly and elected to rate Value for Money as “Undetermined”.

The evaluator acknowledges that JPLG running costs appear high especially compared to stabilization programmes, which appear to be the most comparable in terms of substance and intervention methods. However, the evaluator encourages stakeholders to refrain from such judgements until they have carried out a comparative analysis of value for money using the same methods on the programmes that are being compared.

Sustainability: Moderately Likely

Despite all the challenges and shortcomings of the programme, this remains a good programme which has delivered some results in a difficult environment over a relatively short period of time. There is significant and widespread anecdotal evidence to suggest that many of the initiatives proposed by the programme are taking hold, although, as mentioned in previous sections, there are areas of concern which will have to be addressed. This has led the evaluator to rate sustainability as Moderately *likely*.

- In Somaliland there appears to be ownership and capacity in many district level councils and even workforce. Weakness is possibly in the Ministry of Interior where counterpart is not consistently holding districts and municipalities accountable to the commitments, they have made in the context of the programme.
- In Puntland, a few municipalities appear to have bought into the programme and its approach, while for the rest it is work in progress that will need to be followed-up. The concern is to ensure that at the central levels other agencies, aside from the Ministry of Interior buy into the programme and become committed to its approach and results.
- It is too early to tell how things are evolving in the new FMS.

With the expansion of the program in the FMS, there is a risk that the project will be spread too thin and not

have the ability to continue assisting the north in consolidating the achievements of the previous phases of JPLG.

5. Conclusion and Recommendations

This evaluation concludes that this programme has achieved important results and has been able to carry out, over a long period of time interventions which, in nature and scope are different than most other programmes. The programme has found a “niche” in the development space that immediately follows stabilization activities and the one where institutions are strong enough to meaningfully interact with other counterparts on sustainable development issues. The programme is at its most successful when it can engage on a systematic basis with government counterparts and local stakeholders. This proximity work which distinguishes it is paramount for its success.

The focus on local governments is appropriate and meaningfully complements the ongoing discussions and dialogue between development partners on governance at the federal and FMS level. Further, a focus on local governments allows progress to be made on issues of governance and service delivery, while local stakeholders continue to discuss the institutional infrastructure of the states.

JPLG has acquired a positive reputation vis-à-vis the local counterparts and ownership of the programme among local stakeholders appears to be significant. Accordingly, this evaluation believes that JPLG remains a useful vehicle for five uniquely qualified agencies to cooperate to bring about impactful development to the areas in which the programme operates.

Despite this very positive assessment, the evaluator believes that the programme, which is now reaching maturity, needs to evolve from the current way it does things in order to serve as an “incubator for good practices in local government”. The programme is being called to cater to districts and local governments with increasingly diverse problems. In order to successfully operate, the programme must increase its knowledge base, strengthen its implementation arrangements, provide a broader menu of interventions, and acquire the ability to quickly learn and adapt. On the basis of the analysis above, the evaluator is able to make the following recommendations:

- Review Intervention Modalities
- Refocus the programme squarely on service delivery;
- Use infrastructure investments as a linchpin for inter-agency cooperation;
- Develop new instruments to complement existing ones
- Continue to strengthen Programme Management Arrangements;
- Strengthen the knowledge base and understanding of local circumstances;
- Review the programme’s conceptual framework and improve Monitoring and Evaluation

5.1 Review Intervention Modalities

The premise of the programme is that strengthening the presence and action of formal institutions across the territory is likely to increase their legitimacy and therefore contribute to maintaining peace and stability across the territory. Accordingly, the programme prioritizes focus on local institutions as the level of government closest to the individual citizen and one that can best demonstrate how the presence of the States improves the lives of citizens. The approach that has been followed by the programme thus far, is to prioritize the formation of local institutions. Accordingly, first the programme advocates for the creation of a representative local government (district council and elected mayor), endow the new government with tools (systems, processes and procedures) to manage the activities for which they are responsible and subsequently assist it in creating useful and

sustainable infrastructure by financing investments. Figure 11 describes the current model of engagement.




Figure 11: Current IBLG Engagement Model

This is a sensible approach, which has delivered results in Somaliland and Puntland and in selected areas of the new FMS and Benadir Regional Administration but one that has limitations for future engagement in the new FMS. The programme can only support local governments once district councils have been created and mayors elected. This means that in the new FMS its scope of action at this stage would be limited, since in certain key areas, delegating powers to representative local governments is completely off the table.

This evaluation argues, that different models of engagement can be entertained in areas where the current model of engagement would not succeed. The argument here is in the south emphasis should remain on rebuilding a social contract between the state and the citizen. In this context what matters is that the State, and its formal institutions become present and visible in areas outside of the capital and are responsive to the needs of local populations. It is therefore conceivable that if States agree to meaningfully deconcentrate government services to local levels, similar results could be achieved.

The model of engagement in this environment could be, for example, be to prioritize the deconcentrating of government institutions to the local level, endow it with tools to carry out meaningful consultation with local populations and use infrastructure investment as an incentive. This would encourage the increased visible presence of the formal institutions, while bypassing, for a time, the governance question. Figure 12 depicts the proposed model of engagement.



The evaluator is not suggesting that the old engagement model should be replaced, or that the one presented is the only appropriate one, it instead is arguing that the programme could entertain the possibility of having multiple models of engagement, depending on the political economy situation and provided the overall objectives of the programme are met. Much like it did during the initial conceptualization of the programme, it would have, under these circumstances define what “meaningful deconcentration” means and to soberly evaluate the risks associated with the different engagement models.

The evaluator further suggests that in order to be relevant, especially as it engages more deeply in the new FMS, the programme must be able to customize its interventions depending on the circumstances of the individual districts. Each district has different circumstances and the approach that is taken by the programme to encourage

equitable delivery of good services should be adjusted to meet those requirements.

In areas where the programme has been active and successful, support should be conditioned on local governments becoming more responsible for data gathering, impact measurement, monitoring and evaluation of their activities and budgeting responsibly (accounting for the requirements of operation and maintenance and limiting personnel expenditures). In Somaliland and Puntland, therefore, strengthening local development can be achieved by place additional emphasis should be placed on encouraging local governments to develop a small but stable pool of qualified employees, avoiding the total replacement of staff every time a new council and mayor takes control.

5.2 Refocus the programme squarely on Service Delivery

The programme has been heavily focused on laying the foundation for the successful activity of local governments, arguing, perhaps dogmatically, that local governments as the closest institutions to the citizen are likely to be more responsive to local needs and deliver better services in an equitable fashion. It has accordingly focused on developing laws, frameworks, procedures and systems to enable the functioning of these local governments. This is important, and should not be neglected, however, ultimately local governments will become legitimate if they are perceived to be delivering services that are useful to the citizen.

The strength of the program, in the eyes of the evaluator, is the recognition that improving governance and service delivery is not “just” about establishing transparent governance systems, drafting rules and procedures or “just” creating improved infrastructure, it’s that a successful and sustainable intervention at the local level requires a concerted multi-faceted intervention over a protracted period of time in a specific and narrow geographical location. This is fundamental in order to establish a sustainable and benign institutional presence in the territory.

Refocusing the program on service delivery does not require a change the way JPLG engages with the client, or the nature and scope of the services it provides. Instead it refocuses the way the programme approaches the issue of local government development and sequences and evaluates its contributions to local governments and other stakeholders.

Refocusing the project on service delivery increases the entry points to have meaningful dialogue about local governance with authorities. In areas where Local Government Development has not taken hold, it opens up the opportunities to engage with other levels of government, such as the central governments and assisting them to deconcentrate some key activities across the FMS.

5.3 Use Infrastructure Investments as a Lynchpin for Inter-agency Cooperation

One of the difficulties that the Joint Programme on Local Governance has encountered is how to ensure a better coordination of activities between the member agencies. Consistently with the recommendation of a more customized approach to intervention in different districts, the evaluation suggests that each agency focus on providing services which can be used to maximize the catalytic effects of the proposed investment, consistently with its area of experience and expertise.

Using the infrastructure investments as the lynchpin for inter-agency cooperation does not mean that the program would change its focus, or the nature and scope of its interventions, instead it would use the opportunity to roll out and implement some of the strategies the program has developed, providing local stakeholders

tangible examples of how a coordinated approach which includes, governance, community participation, and sound HR management can really impact the local reality.

Finally, this could be an opportunity to encourage better coordination participating agencies and provide the programme with opportunities to showcase the benefits of a joint programme.

5.4 Develop new instruments to complement existing ones.

JPLG relies on the equal treatment of all districts participating in the programme. The premise is if you comply with the requirements of the programme, then you are eligible for support. This must continue if the programme is to maintain credibility vis-à-vis current programme beneficiaries. In certain areas, however, the program has to contend with the activities of larger and more resource wealthy development partners who are taking up some of the activities that the programme was focusing on. In those areas, the program still has a role to play in consolidating the gains from previous programme activity, but the nature and scope of this assistance changes.

In the course of its future expansion in the FMS, the programme will have to contend with a variety of district-level circumstances which will look particularly different from the ones encountered thus far in the north. The program, therefore, will be called to respond in a much more nuanced fashion. If the programme is to provide more customized solutions, it must develop new instruments, with different modalities that enable it to constructively engage with government entities which no longer meet the criteria of the initial JPLG interventions as well of those who have just recently sought assistance from the programme. With regards to FMS that are not willing to empower local communities to develop local representative councils and elected mayors, a “light approach” which would provide fewer benefits could be envisaged.

Moreover, as districts mature, the question of whether and how to remain engaged with these districts arises. During the course of the past few years, there have been many discussions among donors and programme management on how to phase out districts from JPLG support, and what this phasing out practically means. To address this issue, this evaluation suggests the development of a fund for excellence in local governance. This fund, open to all agencies and districts across the Somaliland and FMS, would reward those districts who are attempting to develop solutions to improve the equitable delivery of services at the local level. Because the programme is demand-based, it is likely although not certain, that more advanced districts would have better access to the fund resources. However, the fund can also be used to spread good practices in local governance and to recognize those individuals, policy makers and civil servants who are fostering improved service delivery and gender inclusion for their communities.

Finally, the programme must be able to encourage better management of Human Resources by thinking about the development of an instrument capable to channel Local Government’s need to provide social assistance to its citizens in a transparent way, this would enable local government to focus their revenue on improving wages and strengthen the professionalism of the local government staff.

5.5 Continue to Strengthen Programme Management Arrangements

Programme Management should be strengthened along three dimensions. First centralizing administration at the level of the PMU. Second, increase the level of technicity by engaging agency leads to provide even more thematic and technical leadership. Third, focus on how to improve the ability of the programme to carry out proximity work, which is at the center of successful and sustainable support to local governments.

5.5.1 Centralize Administration contract and staff management responsibilities to PMU

The evaluator recognizes that resolving administrative and coordination matters is a highly sensitive and complex endeavor. However, it is important that if agency leads refocus their efforts on providing technical assistance, they will have to be freed from administrative concerns. Currently, the PMU is expected to carry-out Nairobi-level liaison and coordination, as well as with the management and oversight of field activities and staff in Somalia. However, the field staff do not have a direct reporting line to the PMU, reporting instead to their respective agencies. Meanwhile, the JPLG II programme managers of each UN partner agency have a hybrid role: a program management role as the entity responsible for drafting, managing and implementing the annual work plan and budget and overseeing agency staff on the field, and a technical role in supporting the development of policies and strategies relating to technical aspects of JPLG II activities. This arrangement is burdensome and muddles the line of accountability. Transferring administration and contracting responsibilities, although not financial responsibility, to the PMU would clarify the matrix relationship within the programme, strengthen the influence of the PMU vis-à-vis programme staff and reduce operation costs. If feasible these functions could be contracted out to the PMU on a trial basis. Clarifying program management structure has been a recurring recommendation over the life of the project.

5.5.2 Empower agency leads to focus on providing technical leadership

Institutional development work, especially in post-conflict environment is labor intensive. It requires continuous hand holding and sustained policy dialogue. The program addresses this issue by deploying a number of technical consultants within the agencies to support the policy maker and that is fine. But this cannot replace the policy dialogue which agency leads could provide. They have the influence, gravitas and experience to conduct sometime complex and difficult discussions with the decision maker that technical consultants would not be able to provide. They would also be able to provide increased technical oversight to programme staff carrying out proximity work and enable them to provide direct, sustained and consistent technical assistance to the client. They would further provide additional mentoring to deployed staff who are meant to assist the authorities in their development.

Finally, it will give technical leads the opportunity to reflect on customized technical solutions which are adapted to the specific environment of each district as well as the opportunity of developing and following up on innovative initiatives to strengthen service delivery at the local level.

5.5.3 Focus on improving proximity work by the programme

The ability of this programme to succeed in the Somali environment depends on its ability to provide sustained proximity assistance to the concerned stakeholders. This is well understood by the programme management which has struggled, given the security situation, to develop a workable model. The programme has relied on a combination of technical consultants within the administrations and the development of an agile team on the ground responsible to oversee programme activities.

This approach has had some success but can be improved by entrusting the team with carrying out more systematic technical work, under the guidance of the technical lead directly with the stakeholders and reducing the number of technical consultants injected in the administrations. Programme staff have credibility and clout that technical consultants do not necessarily have and would be able to engage with local authorities on more meaningful policy dialogue.

5.6 Strengthen the information base and Knowledge of local circumstances

A customized approach presupposes that the programme has a good understanding of the realities on the ground in each of the districts. While this is on the whole true and local staff are knowledgeable about the different areas, it is important to systematize the acquisition of information on local circumstances and to use the information to define programming priorities. As an element of this process, the evaluator recommends:

- Carrying out, before any engagement strategy is developed, a detailed political economy analysis of the circumstances of each district.
- Strengthening the LDF feasibility study to include an improved social and economic assessment of the programme's impacts
- Review more systematically the situation of marginalized groups and how the programme can improve their integration into society.

5.7 Review the Programme's conceptual framework and strengthen Monitoring and Evaluation

If the programme is to become more flexible and focused on delivering services to the local population, the conceptual framework and theories of change will have to be reviewed and amended.

Additionally, strengthening the M&E system is an immediate priority as the system needs to be adapted to better monitor outcome and impact. This is not the exclusive responsibility of the programme. Instead, programme beneficiaries need to also be tasked in the collection of accurate, timely data, perhaps making it a precondition, in the districts with the capacity to do so, for eligibility to LDF funds. (M&E of the activities it manages as well as those of the central authorities in their district is a function of any well- functioning district-level government).

Finally, the programme needs to develop improved simple indicators from existing and newly collected data to evaluate progress towards stated objectives. Annex 3 provides suggestions of indicators which could effectively be used in these circumstances.